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SERIAL: (U) IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424

TEXT

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/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

COUNTRY: (U) CHINA (CH).

SUBJECT: IIR (b)(3):10 USC 424 MARTIAL LAW AND PUBLIC SECURITY (U).

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 890601.

REQS: (U) (b)(3):10 USC 424

SOURCE: (b)(1),1.4 (c)

SUMMARY: ~~(S)~~ INDICATIONS OF DIVISION WITHIN POLICE AND PAP RANKS OVER THE ISSUE OF HOW TO HANDLE THE CURRENT UNREST. PUBLIC SECURITY ORGANS DEEMED UNRELIABLE AND UNTRAINED. POLICE ORDERED OFF THE STREETS UPON DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW.

(b)(1),1.4 (c)

TEXT: 1. ~~(S)~~ ASKED (b)(1),1.4 FOR AN EXPLANATION OF WHY THE ARMY WAS CALLED IN TO RESTORE ORDER UNDER MARTIAL LAW, RATHER THAN USING THE PEOPLE'S ARMED POLICE (PAP) OR PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES TO ENFORCE PUBLIC ORDER DURING THE CURRENT PERIOD OF UNREST. (b)(1),1.4 (c) THAT HIS PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS LED HIM TO BELIEVE THAT THIS DECISION WAS MADE IN LIGHT OF THE PERCEIVED UNRELIABILITY AND UNTRAINED CHARACTER OF THE CHINESE PUBLIC SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING THE PAP.

2. ~~(S)~~ AS AN EXAMPLE OF UNRELIABILITY, (b)(1),1.4 (c) THAT HE HAD OBSERVED STUDENTS FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF PUBLIC SECURITY, WHERE MANY OF BEIJING'S POLICE OFFICERS ARE TRAINED, PARTICIPATING IN DEMONSTRATIONS. APPROXIMATELY 200 STUDENT POLICE OFFICERS TOOK PART ON A NIGHTLY BASIS IN THE DEMONSTRATIONS IN DOWNTOWN BEIJING DURING THE HEIGHT OF THE UNREST. HE SAID THAT PERSONAL DISCUSSIONS WITH SOME FACULTY AND STUDENTS AT THE UNIVERSITY REVEALED SUPPORT FOR THE GOALS OF THE STUDENT-LED MOVEMENT, I.E. ELIMINATION OF CORRUPTION AND POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION. MANY OF THE POLICE STUDENTS EXPRESSED DISSATISFACTION WITH COMMUNIST PARTY CONTROL AND CORRUPTION WITHIN POLICE RANKS. ONE YOUNG FACULTY MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC SECURITY UNIVERSITY (PSU) WHO HAD SHOWN SUPPORT FOR THE DEMONSTRATORS WAS RECENTLY REASSIGNED, WITHOUT EXPLANATION, TO A POSTING IN AN OUTER PROVINCE.

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3. ~~(c)~~ TRAINING IN CROWD CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC UNREST ALSO APPEARS TO BE LACKING. (b)(1),1.4 RECOUNTED HOW HE HAD WATCHED THE PAP ATTEMPT, WITHOUT SUCCESS, TO BLOCK THE PATH OF AN EARLIER DEMONSTRATION. HE SAID THAT THE PAP SIMPLY FORMED THREE RANKS OF SOLDIERS ACROSS THE WIDTH OF THE STREET IN FRONT OF THE FRIENDSHIP HOTEL. APPROACHING STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS WERE ABLE TO EASILY GET BEHIND THE PAP POSITION, FORCING THE PAP TO FALL BACK TO A SUBSEQUENT POSITION. (b)(1),1.4 (WATCHED THIS PROCESS GO THROUGH FIVE ITERATIONS (b)(1),1.4 (c) TOLD (b) THAT THE PAP HAD OBVIOUSLY NEVER BEEN TRAINED IN THE PROPER PROCEDURE OF SIMPLY BLOCKING OFF A STREET. WHILE THIS IS ONLY ONE EXAMPLE, (b)(1),1.4 HAS DISCUSSED ANTI-RIOT AND CROWD CONTROL WITH PSU OFFICIALS AND CONCLUDED THAT NO TRAINING IN THESE AREAS WAS BEING PROVIDED.

4. ~~(c)~~ (b)(1),1.4 ALSO BELIEVES THAT THE PUBLIC SECURITY ORGANIZATION IS TOO FRAGMENTED TO PERMIT A COHERENT RESPONSE TO GENERAL UNREST. HE SAID THAT THE PUBLIC SECURITY BUREAU DIVISIONS MANAGING DIFFERENT FUNCTIONS-- TRAFFIC CONTROL, INVESTIGATIONS, FIRE-FIGHTING, ETC.-- WERE TOO LOOSELY ASSOCIATED TO ALLOW THE PUBLIC SECURITY MINISTRY TO MOUNT A CENTRALLY COORDINATED RESPONSE TO UNREST.

/***** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 *****/

5. ~~(c)~~ WHEN MARTIAL LAW WAS DECLARED ON 20 MAY 89, ALL PUBLIC SECURITY VEHICLES WERE ORDERED OFF THE STREETS. (b)(1),1.4 OFFERED THIS AS AN EXPLANATION WHEN (b) ASKED WHY PAP OR POLICE WERE NOT SEEN ON THE STREETS DURING THE INITIAL PERIOD OF MARTIAL LAW.

6. ~~(c)~~ (b) HAD HEARD REPORTS OF STUDENTS THREATENING SELF-IMMOLATION AT TIANANMEN SQUARE SHORTLY BEFORE THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW. (b)(1),1.4 SAID THAT THE PUBLIC SECURITY MINISTRY RESPONDED TO THOSE THREATS BY SENDING 4,500 PLAIN CLOTHES OFFICERS INTO THE SQUARE. THE HEAVY PRESENCE OF POLICE OFFICERS THROUGHOUT THE SQUARE WOULD INSURE THAT ANY ATTEMPT TO ACTUALLY FOLLOW THROUGH WITH THE THREAT WOULD HAVE BEEN QUICKLY SQUELCHED.

7. ~~(c)~~ (b)(1),1.4 CONCLUDED HIS REMARKS BY SAYING THAT THE POLICE HAD FULLY EXPECTED THE PLA TO ENTER THE CITY IN FORCE ON THE DAY MARTIAL LAW WAS DECLARED.

(b)(1),1.4 (d)

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(b)(1),1.4 (d)

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