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Ambasciata d'Italia a Londra
Il Ministro

London, 17th August 1982.

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PS/POS
Sir J. Bullard
Mr. Giffard
ECO (E)
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MCAD

Dear Mrs Secretary,

In the absence of Ambassador Cagiati, at present in Scotland, I take pleasure in enclosing, herewith, a message addressed to you by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Signor Emilio Colombo.

Please believe me, very sincerely
Yours
Luigi Fontana Giusti

Luigi M. Fontana Giusti,
Minister.

JMK
18/8

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19 AUG 1982	
INDEX	REGISTRY
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Re [signature]	DB

The Rt. Hon. Francis Pym, MC., M.P.,
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
LONDON, S.W.1.

encl.

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE ET CHER COLLEQUE,

DE RETOUR D'UN VOYAGE EN AMERIQUE LATINE, QUI M'A CONDUIT AU PEROU, AU BRESIL ET EN ARGENTINE, JE DESIRE FAIRE PART A VOUS-MEME COMME AUX AUTRES COLLEGUES DE LA COMMUNAUTE, DE QUELQUES REFLEXIONS ET APPRECIATIONS QUI POURRONT, JE PENSE, / ^{ETRE} DE QUELQUE UTILITE POUR LE TRAVAIL COMMUN DANS LE CADRE / ^{DE} COOPERATION POLITIQUE EUROPEENNE. A LIMA, OUTRE J'AI REUNIS EN / TOUS LES AMBASSADEURS ITALIENS AUPRES DES ETATS LATINO-AMERICAINS ET J'AI PU AINSI OBTENIR UNE VUE D'ENSEMBLE DE LA SITUATION DANS LA REGION.

1. LE PROBLEME D'UNE RELANCE DU RAPPORT EURO-LATINO-AMERICAIN APRES LE CONFLIT DES FALKLANDS EST PARTOUT RESSENTI VIVEMENT. IL EST VIVEMENT RESSENTI, DIRAIS-JE, EN TERMES A LA FOIS POLEMQUES ET CONSTRUCTIFS, EN CE SENS QU'IL EXISTE DES RESSENTIMENTS ET DES ~~MA~~ MALENTENDUS, MAIS QU'IL EXISTE EN MEME TEMPS UNE FORTE VOLONTE DE DIALOGUE. SUR LES RESSENTIMENTS DERIVANT DU CONFLIT POURRAIT PREVALOIR (BIEN ENTENDU AVEC DE PLUS GRANDES DIFFICULTES EN ARGENTINE) - IL ME SEMBLE - LA FERME RESOLUTION DE DONNER ENFIN LE DEPART A UN RAPPORT QUI DEVIENNE PLUS POLITIQUE ET QUI SOIT PLUS SUIVI ET PLUS INTENSE, ENTRE LES DIX ET LE MONDE LATINO-AMERICAIN. IL FAUT VEILLER TRES ATTENTIVEMENT A UNE TENDANCE QUI SE MANIFESTE AU VENEZUELA, ET PLUS RECEMMENT AUSSI EN COLOMBIE, EN FAVEUR D'UNE PLUS GRANDE INTEGRATION DE CES PAYS DANS LE MOUVEMENT DES NON-ALIGNES. IL N'Y A PAS D'IDEES PRECISES SUR LES MODALITES DE RELANCE DU RAPPORT EURO-LATINO-AMERICAIN, MAIS L'ON S'ATTEND CERTAINEMENT A LA FORMULATION DE PROPOSITIONS DE LA PART DES DIX ET, EN TOUS CAS, A UNE PRESENCE ET UNE ATTENTION PLUS GRANDES QUE PAR LE PASSE. JE PENSE QUE MEME LES VOIES BILATERALES DONT DISPOSE CHACUN DE NOUS SONT UTILES: MAIS IL EST NECESSAIRE DE NOUS COORDONNER D'AVANTAGE. C'EST UN DESIR DE TOUS, MAIS PARTICULIEREMENT ESPLICITE AU BRESIL; PAYS QUI ME PARAIT DECIDE A ASSUMER TOUJOURS PLUS NETTEMENT LE ROLE ET LES RESPONSABILITES QUI LUI REVIENTENT.

2. PERSONNE N'A DISSIMULE LA PREOCCUPATION AVEC LA-QUELLE ON CONSIDERE LA DETERIORATION DES RELATIONS AVEC LES ETATS-UNIS.

QUELQUES-UNS DES ASPECTS DU COMPORTEMENT AMERICAIN AU COURS DE LA CRISE RECENTE ONT ETE RESSENTIS PLUS ENCORE QUE LA SOLIDARITE COMMUNAUTAIRE AVEC LA GRANDE-BRETAGNE. A TORT OU A RAISON, ON AVAIT COMPTE SUR UNE SOLIDARITE INTERAMERICAINE QUI AURAIT PREVALU SUR TOUTE AUTRE CONSIDERATION.

3. L'ARGENTINE CONSTITUE NATURELLEMENT UN CAS PARTICULIER. LE PROCESSUS D'ACHEMINEMENT VERS LA DEMOCRATIE ME SEMBLE SUR. TOUTEFOIS, EN RAISON DES TRES SERIEUSES CONDITIONS ECONOMIQUES, FINANCIERES ET SOCIALES ACTUELLES, ET DU PROBLEME QUE REPRESENT LA GRAVE BLESSURE INFLIGEE A SON ORGUEIL NATIONAL, LA TACHE DE FORCES DEMOCRATIQUES N'APPARAIT PAS FACILE. CELLES-CI, EN OUTRE, APRES AVOIR ETE LONGTEMPS ELOIGNEES DES PROBLEMES CONCRETS, AURONT INDUBITABLEMENT DES DIFFICULTES A ASSUMER LES DURES RESPONSABILITES ACTUELLES QUI S'IMPOSENT POUR TRACER LE CHEMIN VERS UNE REPRISE DU PAYS.

4. TOUJOURS EN CE QUI CONCERNE L'ARGENTINE, LE PROBLEME SE POSE EN OUTRE DES INITIATIVES QUE BUENOS AIRES ENTEND PROMOUVOIR AU COURS DE LA PROCHAINE ASSEMBLEE GENERALE DE L'ONU. AVEC L'APPUI D'AUTRES PAYS LATINO-AMERICAINS (DONT PRINCIPALEMENT, DANS CETTE PHASE, CELUI DU MEXIQUE) L'ARGENTINE VISE A UNE RESOLUTION QUI, DE QUELQUE FACON, EQUILIBRERAIT, AUX YEUX DE L'OPINION PUBLIQUE, LA GRAVE DEFAITE QU'ELLE A SUBIE. J'AI ETE TRES FRANC. J'AI DIT QUE DU COTE ITALIEN, MALGRE LES DEGATS CAUSES PAR L'INADMISSIBLE COUP DE FORCE ARGENTIN, ON POUVAIT CERTES SOUHAITER UNE REPRISE DU DIALOGUE ENTRE LONDRES ET BUENOS AIRES QUI SE PREVAUDRAIT DU CADRE DES NATIONS UNIES. MAIS J'AI AJOUTE QU'IL NE ME SEMBLAIT PAS ACCEPTABLE DU COTE EUROPEEN QUE L'ON PRETENDRE DONNER, MOYENNANT UNE RESOLUTION DE L'ASSEMBLEE GENERALE, DES INDICATIONS PREJUDICIELLES ET DE NATURE A CONSTITUER UN ENGAGEMENT SUR LES OBJECTIFS DU DIALOGUE TOUCHANT AU FUTUR DE L'ARCHIPEL DES FALKLANDS. JE PENSE QUE DU COTE EUROPEEN IL EST NECESSAIRE DE SUIVRE DE PRES L'EVOLUTION DE CE DEBAT, SOIT A BUENOS AIRES, SOIT DANS LES AUTRES CAPITALES LATINO-AMERICAINES, ET AUSSI POUR EMPECHER QU'EN SEPTEMBRE PROCHAIN NE SE DETERMINE UNE

NOUVELLE SITUATION DE FORTE POLEMIQUE DANS LE CADRE OCCIDENTAL, QUI VERRAIT L'EUROPE ET L'AMERIQUE LATINE SUR DES LIGNES OPPOSEES. NOUS DEVONS, A MON AVIS, FAIRE TOUT LE POSSIBLE POUR EVITER CELA, OU TOUT AU MOINS POUR ATTENUER AU MAXIMUM, DANS UN ESPRIT DE LOYAUETE RECIPROQUE ENTRE EUROPEENS ET LATINO-AMERICAINS ET DE COMPREHENSION DES POSITIONS RESPECTIVES, LES RIPERCUSSIONS NEGATIVES D'UNE TELLE POLEMIQUE.

5. JE CROIS QUE NOUS DEVRONS AUSSI REFLECHIR A CE QU'IL NOUS CONVIENT DE FAIRE EN FACE DES SERIEUX PROBLEMES ECONOMIQUES ET FINANCIERS DES PAYS LATINO-AMERICAINS. LES DIX, CERTES, NE DOIVENT PAS S'EN FAIRE UNE CHARGE EXCLUSIVE, MAIS IL NE ME SEMBLE PAS SAGE D'IGNORER LA SITUATION NI DU POINT DE VUE POLITIQUE, NI POUR CE QUI A TRAIT AUX INTERETS IMPORTANTS DE CHACUN DE NOUS EN AMERIQUE LATINE.

6. DANS LE CADRE LATINO-AMERICAIN, LE PROBLEME PARTICULIER DES ETATS DE L'AMERIQUE CENTRALE SE FAIT TOUJOURS PLUS AIGU ET PLUS CONFUS. IL Y A ^{LE} RISQUE QUE SUR LES TENSIONS ET DIFFICULTES LOCALES NE VIENNE SE GREFFER, PLUS DANGEREUSEMENT ENCORE QUE JUSQU'A PRESENT, LA TEMATIQUE DE LA CONFRONTATION EST-OUEST. JE CROIS DONC QU'IL EST NECESSAIRE DE REPRENDRE L'ARGUMENT ENTRE LES DIX, EN CHERCHANT A SOLLICITER ET A CONTRIBUER AUX EFFORTS DES AUTRES PAYS EN MESURE DE LE FAIRE (ETATS UNIS, MEXIQUE, VENEZUELA, CANADA), EFFORTS DESTINES A OFFRIR UNE PERSPECTIVE D'EQUILIBRE POLITIQUE, TOUT AU MOINS POUR LES PAYS DE L'AMERIQUE CENTRALE ENCORE SUSCEPTIBLES D'EN FAIRE LEUR PROPOS.

VEUILLEZ CROIRE, MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE ET CHER AMI,

EMILIO COLOMBO.



British Embassy
Via XX Settembre 80A 00187 Rome

Telex 61049 Telephone 4755441

Pa
Walter Ameglio P. S. G.
R. 2/10

R M Jackson Esq
CAND
FCC

REC	0211
23 AUG 1982	
	REGISTRY
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See Jackson | *DS*

Your reference

Our reference

Date

19 August 1982

COLOMBO'S VISIT TO LATIN AMERICA: COMMUNITY BRIEFING

1. The MFA briefed us yesterday on Colombo's visit. They apologised for the delay (Colombo returned to Rome on 11 August); they had been waiting for the head of the MFA's Latin American division, who accompanied Colombo, to return but he was still in Chile. It was not a very exciting briefing, but I report it because it fills in one or two gaps in our telnos 419 and in my letter to you of 12 August.
2. The MFA said that Colombo's main objective in visiting Peru, Brazil and Argentina had been to build bridges between Latin America and the West, to help avert the growth of isolationist foreign policies in the region and (in Argentina) to encourage a return to democracy. They played down the bilateral aspects of Colombo's visit, though doubtless these featured prominently.
3. In Peru, Colombo found the President and Foreign Minister anxious to get over this awkward phase in European/Latin American relations as soon as possible. Both in Peru and Brazil, there was some loose talk of forming a separate association of the Spanish and Portuguese-speaking countries of the region, on the grounds that unity of action within the OAS was hampered by the US and Caribbean presence, and that Washington would heed Latin views more if the latter spoke with a united voice. The Peruvians stressed, however, that they wanted the OAS to remain in being and hoped for better relations with the Americans. On the Falklands, they recognised that a UN resolution this autumn affirming Argentine sovereignty over the Islands would be counter-productive; on the face of it, this seems to distance the Peruvians somewhat from the current Mexican initiative (see below). They favoured the resumption of negotiations between the Argentines and ourselves, but without any predetermined outcome.
4. The Brazilians told Colombo that they had been completely taken by surprise by the Argentine invasion, not least because the Argentines had announced only shortly before that they wanted to prompt a UN initiative designed to speed up the negotiations. Their policy had been dictated by their wish both to safeguard Argentine/Brazilian relations and to maintain the best possible relations with us. The Brazilians did not believe that the

/present



present situation in the Islands could last long; the maintenance of UK troops there could only be a transitional arrangement, and there would have to be a "gradual political opening". In the forthcoming GA the Brazilians would like a text which urged negotiations on both sides, entrusted the Secretary-General with the task of mediation, and cited previous Security Council and GA resolutions. On the other hand, they would be opposed to specific references to decolonisation and sovereignty, which would lead to a lot of confusion, would not contribute to a solution and upset European/Latin American relations. Colombo said that any text should refer only to past Security Council (and not GA) resolutions. Nor would it help to talk about decolonisation or to quote the non-aligned text.

5. More generally, the Brazilians shared the Peruvian view that the crisis had not produced a lasting rift between Europe and Latin America. There were problems, but they had existed long before the crisis. Relations with Washington would be trickier to restore. There was no Brazilian interest in a purely Latin American regional organisation; in particular, the Brazilians did not want to isolate the Anglophone Caribbean.

6. Colombo spent 3 days in Argentina. He met the mothers of some of the "disappeared" at the Italian Ambassador's residence. He also saw representatives of the parties and talked to the press. The meeting with the mothers had been the price that the Argentines had been asked to pay for Colombo's visit; but the Italians expect the Argentine military to insist that the cases of the "disappeared" be well and truly buried as a condition for returning power to the civilians. The Argentines apparently said that they were considering freeing political prisoners whose trials were still pending.

7. Colombo found the Argentines very worried about Central America. While they believed that political solutions in, for example, Salvador must emerge from within the countries themselves, they advocated outside support for any such solutions once reached, mentioning in this connection the Europeans, Mexico and Venezuela. They did not believe that Cuba was directly responsible for what was happening in Central America, though undoubtedly it had profited. They were worried about recent changes in Bolivia. On inter-American links, the Argentines said that Panama had pressed for a meeting of Spanish and Portuguese-speaking Foreign Ministers only, to set up some form of consultative organisation. The Argentines commented that they would like to strengthen Latin American unity, but not at the expense of relations with the Americans and Caribbean countries. They were opposed to the creation of new organisations.

8. Turning to the Falklands, the Argentines predictably told Colombo that they would persist in their claim of sovereignty.

/They gave



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They gave him two drafts, the first of a letter to the Secretary-General requesting the inscription of the Falklands item on the agenda of the GA (as distinct, I assume, from the agenda of the Fourth Committee); and a Mexican draft resolution which cited previous Assembly, Security Council and non-aligned resolutions. I assume you already have this; if not please let me know and I will try to extract a copy. They confirmed that they would not negotiate bilaterally with Britain, but wanted negotiations in New York under the Secretary-General's auspices. Colombo made it clear that the Italians disagreed with these tactics. He repeated that any Assembly text should be confined to underlining the desirability of a resumption of negotiations, with a mandate for the Secretary-General but no specific references to previous resolutions (I am not sure whether he included SCR.502 and 505 in this context). Otherwise, Colombo said, the Argentines would find it hard to achieve wide support.

9. We were given a copy of the letter Colombo sent to his Community colleagues, including ourselves, on 14 August. No doubt you have already received it from the Italian Embassy in London. The MFA said vaguely that they expected to put forward some ideas for the handling of the Falklands question at the UN at the meeting of Foreign Ministers in Copenhagen on 9 September. On the assumption that Colombo will still be able to see Mr Pym in London on 7 September, you will have an opportunity to disabuse Colombo of any wild ideas for a consensus resolution.

10. Finally, I should record that according to the MFA there was no discussion in Buenos Aires of the arms embargo. We all greeted this news with some incredulity. I limited myself to saying that we certainly hoped that there would be an opportunity early in September for serious Community discussion of the handling of the New York debate before our partners took any firm decisions, and reminded the meeting that we had often abstained on or voted against Argentine-inspired resolutions in the past because of the references they made to previous, unacceptable, resolutions of the Assembly. The MFA said that Colombo had made it clear to the Argentines that European/Latin American relations could be set back by a messy UN debate.

Yours ever
Tom Richardson
 T L Richardson

cc: BIS, BUENOS AIRES

Chanceries: BRASILIA, LIMA, PARIS, BONN, COPENHAGEN,
 WASHINGTON, UKHIS NEW YORK, UKREP BRUSSELS

R P Osborne, WED, FCO

Mr Wood
WED

Mr Young

You may like to glance at my minute. At 31/8

WED 02/11

- 1 SEP 1982

REGISTRY

FOR TALK

PA 3/8 JB

THE ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S IDEAS REGARDING RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA

20A
All meant was it isn't all bad.

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1. With reference to your minute of 23 August to Mr Fearn regarding the ideas contained in Sr Colombo's message to the Secretary of State dated 17 August, following his South American tour. I think on balance we have every reason to share Sr Colombo's concern over the intention of certain South American countries to seek membership of the NAM. Traditionally most South American countries have seen themselves as an offshoot of Christian Western Europe and as defenders of Western values. As a result they have tended to align themselves with the US and Western Europe.

2. The current moves towards the NAM represent a rejection of this traditional approach in favour of a policy motivated by the belief that their interests will be better promoted by distancing themselves from the US and Europe and joining this Third World pressure group. Certain Latin American countries unfortunately appear to believe that there is more to be gained from a policy of confrontational pressure than by one of good relations.

3. I fear that Latin American association with NAM might well lead to it becoming a more effective pressure group without any corresponding benefit in terms of greater moderation. Linked to this move towards association with the NAM is a parallel initiative by certain Latin American countries to create an exclusive regional organisation which would largely supersede the OAS. This body would not include the US or the Anglophone Caribbean. Such moves are clearly designed to undermine the links with the West and to diminish Western influence.

1 wonder

4. In the longer term I would not imagine that the US would have much cause for concern over greater European involvement in Latin America. Most of the difficulties so far have stemmed from German and French attitudes towards Central America. European countries have played a useful part in helping the US and Canada to encourage stability in the Caribbean and there is no reason why they should not make a similar, if less prominent, contribution in Latin America. The Americans have as much, if not more interest than we have in preventing any incursion in the region which the Russians would no doubt seek to exploit. And the US would clearly appreciate the EC taking on more of the aid burden which of course the majority of the EC countries are prepared to do, with the notable exception of the UK.

?

5. We have good reasons for being seen to be in favour of encouraging a European view and a reinforced Euro-Latin American relationship. Such efforts enable us to harness the prestige and weight of the Community behind our own fence-mending exercises which, on our own, are likely to have a more limited impact. Such efforts might also be instrumental in dissuading some of the key Latin American



countries from following the NAM road and the proposal to set up some new exclusive regional body. The EC is now too important a trading partner of Latin America not to be taken seriously and so it has the ability to exercise such a role. However, given our own preoccupation with budgetary constraints it will be difficult for us to make a positive contribution. While we cannot risk the wrath of the Community in the wake of the Falklands crisis by openly opposing their fence-mending exercises, which they see as vital to restoring relations, we are nevertheless effectively undermining their efforts through our attitude to further aid to Central America. It will require a very delicate balancing act if we are to succeed in giving the appearance of supporting European efforts to improve relations with Latin America, while at the same time refusing to contribute to the cost. Our present stance seems to annoy both our EC Partners and the Latin Americans. Partly with this in mind we want every opportunity to be taken to reassure our European Partners that we intend to play a full role in restoring Western/European relations with Latin America. We are therefore including positive passages along these lines in the briefing for the forthcoming round of bilaterals between the Secretary of State's EC colleagues, and hope also to promote the insertion of an appropriate passage in the Presidency statement at the UN.

R. J. Chase

R J Chase
South America Department
233 4970

27 August 1982

Copy to: Sir J Bullard
Mr Walden, Planning Staff
Mr White, MCAD
Mr Edwards, WIAD
Mr Bone, ECD (E)

Mr Fearn, SAmd

(29)

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Mr R. [Signature]	

LATIN AMERICA

(20A)

1. Sir Julian Bullard mentioned in his minute of 18 August that he would be interested to know what departments thought of the Italian Foreign Minister's ideas as expressed in his message of 17 August to the Secretary of State. This is more for you than for me, but I wonder if you might like to take account of two points:

- (a) Colombo is no doubt preaching to the converted when he says that Latin America should be kept as part of the Western family and implies there are dangers in a drift towards the non-aligned movement. There might however be something to be said for having more moderate members in the NAM and there are dangers in our building up our relationship with the area as a sort of surrogate for the United States. The Americans would no doubt be happy enough with increased European aid but might find the increased determination by the Europeans to play a political role awkward. One has only to think of French policies towards Central American countries to illustrate the point. We in Europe already have our differences with the Americans over the Middle East, which is much more important to us.
- (b) The 'Euro-Latin American relationship' only exists in very general terms. It is probably more real for Italy than the UK which has more particular interests (eg Belize and Guyana as well as the Falklands). Even so Europe has a different relationship with the different countries of the area (eg Chile or Brazil) and there are obvious problems about subordinating our particular interests and concerns to a generalised ideal.
- (27)

23 August 1982

cc. Sir J Bullard
Mr Walden, Planning Staff

Am Wood
A M Wood
Western European Department

RESTRICTED

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Giffard

cc Mr Ure o.r.
ECD(E)
UND
MCAD
WED ✓
ERD
Mr Walden
SAmD

I have commented to Mr Giffard by word to see

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19 AUG 1982	
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Rob per (27)
(message bundle too)
19/8 (27)
This is not priority for WFO.
23/8

LATIN AMERICA

1. We spoke about the Italian Foreign Minister's message of 17 August to the Secretary of State.

2. As regards Argentina and the Falklands Islands, we agreed that the draft message being prepared for the Secretary of State to send to his colleagues in the Ten should refer (politely) to Colombo's message, but should explain the limitations on our ability to accept the concept of a 'dialogue between London and Buenos Aires in the framework of the United Nations' - a concept which seems self-evidently right to Colombo. The drafting of this message is going to be tricky and I should like the opportunity to contribute.

3. At slightly greater leisure, I should be interested to know what you and departments think of Colombo's other ideas, some of them more substantial than is often the case in these Ministerial messages, eg the tendency of Latin American governments to edge toward the non-aligned movement (para 1), the prospects for 're-launching the Euro-Latin American relationship' (also para 1) and the suggestion that the Ten should shoulder part of the economic burden in that region (para 5).

4. Separately, or as part of the same exercise, we shall have to consider how far we can go along with Colombo's thoughts about contributing to a perspective of political equilibrium in Central America (para 6). Incidentally, the Chargé d'Affaires at the American Embassy told me yesterday that he presumed that the bullish piece in the New York Herald Tribune about the improving situation in Central America was an attempt by the Latino lobby in Washington to rally support for President Reagan's Caribbean initiative, which threatened to run into the rocks for lack of funds.

18 August 1982

J L Bullard

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