




- 2 -

best to keep any such message in reserve: the right time to send one would be to seek support for any new diplomatic initiative following the Secretary of State's visit to Washington.

5. If you agree, it would seem best to give Mr Harding a reply now, in the absence of the Secretary of State.



1 May 1982

P R Fearn  
Emergency Unit

Mr Fearn

This reached me late on 2 May. It seemed to me preferable to await the S/State's return from Winton and NY. We now have the complication of potential Brazilian involvement in the contact group. Can we add to the draft in such a way as to warn HMA of this? I imagine we cannot yet ask him to mention it specifically. *Case*  
4/5

48

Mr Fearn *has been*  
*and approved.*  
*Myr.*  
*29/4/82*  
~~Mr Giffard~~

ALB 020/3	
RECEIVED IN DEPT OF DEFENCE	
19 MAY 1982	
DESK OFFICER	RECEIVED
INDEX	PA
	WS 19/5

FALKLANDS: MESSAGE FROM BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT

Problem

1. How to respond to a message from the Brazilian Government urging that no military action should be taken which might impede the negotiating process.

Recommendation

2. I recommend that our Ambassador should be instructed to speak to the Brazilians as in the attached draft telegram.

Argument

3. The message from the Brazilian Government was not a formal one, and Mr Harding was able to respond effectively. However, since he undertook to convey the message to London, we need to consider whether a reply should be sent.

4. The Brazilian message implies that they believe Britain to be abandoning the negotiating process. We should correct this impression: and a reply would be an opportunity once again to state the British case about the need for compliance with SCR 502 and to demonstrate our determination to ensure that Argentina is brought to withdraw its forces from the Falkland Islands. It is still uncertain how Brazil will tilt in the event of conflict and it would be helpful to show that we are ready to listen to and respond to their preoccupations.

*M Williams*

M J Williams  
Emergency Unit

29 April 1982

- cc PS/Mr Onslow
- Mr Ure
- SAMD
- Planning Staff
- Defence Dept
- Emergency Unit

*Beatty*

ALB 020/3	
RECEIVED IN DEPT OF DEFENCE	
11 MAY 1982	
DESK OFFICER	RECEIVED
INDEX	PA
	WS 11/5

File No. ....

Department.....Emergency Unit

Drafted by M J Williams  
(Block Capitals).....

Tel. Extn. ....

OUTWARD

TELEGRAM

Security Classification

Precedence  
IMMEDIATE

DESKBY 291300 Z

FOR  
COMMS. DEPT.  
USE

Despatched (Date) .....  
(Time) ..... Z

POSTBY ..... Z

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin)..... Z(G.M.T.)

(Restrictive Prefix).....

(Security Class.).....

(Caveat/  
Privacy marking).....

(Codeword).....

(Deskby) 29 1300 Z

TO IMMEDIATE DESKBY BRASILIA  
(precedence) (post)

Tel. No. .... of

AND TO (precedence/post) IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

AND TO SAVING.....

INFO.....

INFO SAVING.....

*Surshen*

Distribution:-

[TEXT]

*unnumbered*

YOUR TEL OF 27 APRIL 2045Z: FALKLANDS MESSAGE  
FROM BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT

*Beena*

1. Please speak to Soares as follows, in response  
to the message from the Brazilian Government in your TUR.

2. The British Government remain determined to pursue  
*any opening for* vigorously the negotiating process in which they have  
*cooperated fully* been fully cooperating with the efforts of Mr Haig.

Any settlement must be on the basis of the mandatory  
resolution of the UN Security Council, which called for  
the withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Falklands  
Islands. *meanwhile,* The British Government find that

/it

*which is consistent with the principles underlying their approach to the crisis, let me as explained by the Prime Minister and myself in Parliament.*

military pressure

it is necessary to maintain ~~pressure~~ <sup>including that</sup> on Argentina, ~~by means of the threat of military action~~, since it appears that this is the only way in which the Argentine junta might be persuaded to comply with SCR 502.

3. You should of course refuse to give credit to Costa Mendez's rumours of an ~~announcement~~ of an imminent invasion. ~~However,~~ <sup>At the same time,</sup> the <sup>British Govt's</sup> announcement, <sup>on 29 April</sup> ~~today~~ of a total exclusion zone ~~in~~ 48 hours time, can be regarded as an indication of our determination to bring to an end Argentina's occupation of the Falkland Islands, and our readiness, by giving fair warning, to allow Argentina ample time to ~~comply~~ ~~with it~~ <sup>recognise the need for</sup> ~~its~~ withdrawal.

the  
on Argentines.  
The choice of  
whether they give  
up the what they  
have  
unwillingly  
surrendered, or  
peaceful

whether  
other  
means ~~never~~ be  
used, is  
entirely  
theirs.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

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Bob Storey  
dec. often  
Hijack W4

Richard  
Johnson - own  
I keep asking  
John

Sheffield  
can avoid to call  
for re-consider  
until now.



A2B 020/3.	
10 12 1982	
TO:	FROM:
DATE:	TIME:
cc: PS	

44

Mr Giffard

PS/PUS  
Mr Ure  
Mr Mallaby  
SAmD

FALKLAND ISLANDS : PROPOSED MESSAGE TO THE BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER

PROBLEM

1. Following a discussion with the Brazilian Foreign Minister, our Ambassador has suggested that the Secretary of State should send Sr Guerreiro a message outlining our views.

RECOMMENDATION

2. I recommend against any such message at this stage. I submit a draft telegram to Brasilia.

ARGUMENT

3. It is in our interest to keep our lines open to the Brazilians. It is an important market and Brazilian views carry weight in Latin America. We should also do what we can to dilute Brazilian support for Argentina. Brazil has already agreed to provide the Argentines with some military equipment and training; and as military operations develop, it will come under increasing pressure to get firmly off the fence on Argentina's side.

4. There is, however, little that the Secretary of State could say to Sr Guerreiro at the present moment which would help matters. A message would need to refer to that sent by Sr Guerreiro on 30 April to the UN Secretary-General, which Mr Harding describes as misguided. With the Haig negotiations broken down and following news of the bombing of Port Stanley airport, there are few positive points to make, to which the Brazilians would be receptive. It would therefore seem best

/best



CONFIDENTIAL

Priority/Quality  
IMMEDIATE

best to keep any such message in reserve: the right time to send one would be to seek support for any new diplomatic initiative following the Secretary of State's visit to Washington.

5. If you agree, it would seem best to give Mr Harding a reply now, in the absence of the Secretary of State.

1 May 1982

P R Fearn  
Emergency Unit

Message number	SEAMS	Catchword
File number	Dept	Distribution
TALKLAND ISLANDS		
Drafted by (Block number) P. R. FEARN		
Teletrans number EMERGENCY UNIT		
Authorised for despatch		
Current reference	Time of despatch	

OUT TELEGRAM

Classification and Caveats

CONFIDENTIAL

Precedence/Deskby

IMMEDIATE

CZC  
GRS  
CLASS  
CAVEATS  
DESKBY  
FM FCO  
PRE/ADD  
TEL NO

1 ZCZC  
2 GRS  
3 CONFIDENTIAL  
4  
5  
6 FM FCO  
7 TO IMMEDIATE BRASILIA  
8 TELEGRAM NUMBER  
9 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION : <sup>Priority</sup> IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, IMMEDIATE  
10 UKMIS NEW YORK  
11 YOUR TELEGRAMS NOS.144 AND 145 : FALKLANDS : PROPOSED MESSAGE  
12 TO BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER  
13 1. We have considered this proposal carefully. We accept the  
14 need to keep the Brazilians in play and to prevent an increasing  
15 Brazilian tilt towards Argentina.  
16 2. The problem is that we have little to say to the Brazilians  
17 at this stage which would justify a personal message. It would  
18 need to refer to Sr Guerreiro's message to the UN Secretary-  
19 General, which, as you say, is well-meant but not helpful.  
20 Also, following the breakdown of the Haig negotiations and  
21 growing focus on the military aspects, it would be hard to <sup>with a</sup> ~~draw~~ <sup>stroke</sup>  
22 a line to which the Brazilians could respond. It would therefore  
23 seem best to keep such a message in reserve in case we need to  
24 seek their support for any diplomatic initiative, following my  
25 visit to Washington and New York.

NNNN ends telegram	BLANK	Catchword /PYM
File number	Dept	Distribution FALKLAND ISLANDS STANDARD
Drafted by (Block capitals) P R FEARN		
Telephone number EMERGENCY UNIT		
Authorised for despatch		
Comcen reference	Time of despatch	



OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification and Caveats

CONFIDENTIAL

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2 PYM

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telegram

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Catchword

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CO WASHINGTON (DESKBY 302200Z)

CO UKMIS NEW YORK (DESKBY 302200Z)

30 APR 82

GRS 670

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 302200Z

FM BRASILIA 30:2220Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

REPEATED INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 14 4 OF 30 APRIL

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FALKLANDS: UNITED NATIONS INVOLVEMENT

1. FOREIGN MINISTER SUMMONED ME AT 5.30 PM (302030Z) AND HANDED TO ME COPIES IN ENGLISH AND PORTUGUESE OF AN URGENT MESSAGE WHICH HE HAD JUST SENT TO THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL IN NEW YORK (TEXT IN MIFT).
2. GUERREIRO EXPLAINED THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE MESSAGE, WHICH PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO HAD PERSONALLY APPROVED, WAS TO GIVE SUPPORT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN HIS EFFORTS TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE FALKLANDS DISPUTE, NOW THAT THE HAIG MEDIATION WAS EFFECTIVELY AT AN END. GUERREIRO SAID THAT HE HAD CONTEMPLATED ADDRESSING A SUITABLY PHRASED MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS THE ORGAN RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS RESOLUTION NO 502. BUT HE HAD OPTED IN FAVOUR OF SENDING ONE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL (WHO I GATHER HAD SOLICITED MESSAGES OF THIS KIND), ON THE GROUNDS THAT HE WAS BEST PLACED TO DECIDE HOW TO PLAY THE UN HAND AND THAT IT MIGHT ANYWAY BE PREFERABLE TO HOLD INFORMAL TALKS WITH THE TWO PARTIES BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS CONVENED.
3. I ASKED THE MINISTER WHETHER HE HAD ANY CLEAR IDEA AS TO WHAT MIGHT BE THE MOST SATISFACTORY WAY OUT OF THE PRESENT NEGOTIATING DEADLOCK. HE SAID THAT, AS HE HAD TOLD ME AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS, BRAZIL WOULD BE READY TO PUT FORWARD EVEN THE MOST CRACKPOT IDEAS IF THEY SEEMED TO OFFER ANY WAY OUT. ONE SUCH IDEA, WHICH WAS NOT HIS OWN, WAS THAT BOTH PARTIES SHOULD RENOUNCE THE ENFORCEMENT OF THEIR SOVEREIGNTY IN FAVOUR OF SOME KIND OF UN

COUNCIL WAS CONVENED.

3. I ASKED THE MINISTER WHETHER HE HAD ANY CLEAR IDEA AS TO WHAT MIGHT BE THE MOST SATISFACTORY WAY OUT OF THE PRESENT NEGOTIATING DEADLOCK. HE SAID THAT, AS HE HAD TOLD ME AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS, BRAZIL WOULD BE READY TO PUT FORWARD EVEN THE MOST CRACKPOT IDEAS IF THEY SEEMED TO OFFER ANY WAY OUT. ONE SUCH IDEA, WHICH WAS NOT HIS OWN, WAS THAT BOTH PARTIES SHOULD RENOUNCE THE ENFORCEMENT OF THEIR SOVEREIGNTY IN FAVOUR OF SOME KIND OF UN BODY SPECIALLY CREATED FOR THE PURPOSE. THIS GAVE ME AN OPPORTUNITY OF REPEATING THE ESSENTIALS OF OUR OWN POSITION AND EMPHASISING THAT THE MINDS OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WERE NOT CLOSED TO ANY SOLUTION SO LONG AS (A) IT WAS SEEN NOT TO REWARD THE ARGENTINE AGGRESSION: (B) IT WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ISLANDERS' OWN WISHES: AND (C) IT WAS ACCEPTABLE TO THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT.

4. IN PASSING, I ASKED GUERREIRO HOW HE VIEWED MR HAIG'S STRONG STATEMENT TODAY IN FAVOUR OF THE BRITISH POSITION. HE SAID THAT IT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY CREATE CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES FOR THE UNITED STATES IN SOME LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY THOSE WHICH WERE MOST EMOTIONALLY COMMITTED TO THE ARGENTINE SIDE. BUT HE IMPLIED THAT, THOUGH IT WOULD NOT EXACTLY HELP, IT WOULD CAUSE NO DIFFICULTY IN BRAZIL'S RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES.

#### COMMENT

5. THIS MESSAGE, WHICH WILL UNDOUBTEDLY RECEIVE WIDE PUBLICITY HERE, SEEMS TO BE A CAUTIOUS, IF MISGUIDED, EFFORT BY THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT TO BE SEEN TO BE MAKING A CONSTRUCTIVE MOVE IN THE DIRECTION OF A SOLUTION OF THE PRESENT CRISIS, WITHOUT ACTUALLY STICKING THEIR NECKS OUT. I WOULD GUESS THAT THE MESSAGE OWES MORE TO PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO THAN TO GUERREIRO, WHO TOLD ME ONLY A FEW DAYS AGO THAT HE THOUGHT RECOURSE TO THE UNITED NATIONS WOULD OFFER LITTLE PROSPECT OF PROGRESS TOWARDS A SOLUTION IN THE SHORT TERM. THIS INTERPRETATION WOULD ACCORD BOTH WITH THE INDICATIONS FIGUEIREDO GAVE TO THE AMERICAN DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE EARLIER THIS WEEK (MY UNNUMBERED TEL DATED 272045Z PARAGRAPH 4, REFERS) AND WITH HIS PUBLIC REMARKS TO JOURNALISTS DURING A VISIT TO PORTO ALEGRE ON 28 APRIL, WHEN HE CAREFULLY PROFESSED EQUALLY FRIENDLY FEELINGS FOR BOTH THE ARGENTINE AND BRITISH PEOPLES AND EXPRESSED THE PIOUS HOPE THAT THE LATTER WOULD USE THEIR WELL-KNOWN GOOD SENSE TO FIND A WAY OUT OF THE PRESENT CRISIS - IMPLYING THAT THE ARGENTINES COULD HARDLY BE EXPECTED TO HAVE ANY. /6

6. I DO NOT THINK THAT THE MESSAGE CALLS FOR ANY DIRECT COMMENT FROM US AT THIS STAGE. BUT I GAINED A CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT GUERREIRO WOULD LIKE TO KEEP A BILATERAL DIALOGUE GOING WITH US ON THIS QUESTION.

1. THE DIRECTION OF A SOLUTION OF THE PRESENT CRISIS, WITHOUT ACTUALLY STICKING THEIR NECKS OUT. I WOULD GUESS THAT THE MESSAGE GIVES MORE TO PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO THAN TO GUERREIRO, WHO TOLD ME ONLY A FEW DAYS AGO THAT HE THOUGHT RECOURSE TO THE UNITED NATIONS WOULD OFFER LITTLE PROSPECT OF PROGRESS TOWARDS A SOLUTION IN THE SHORT TERM. THIS INTERPRETATION WOULD ACCORD BOTH WITH THE INDICATIONS FIGUEIREDO GAVE TO THE AMERICAN DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE EARLIER THIS WEEK (MY UNNUMBERED TEL DATED 272045Z PARAGRAPH 4, REFERS) AND WITH HIS PUBLIC REMARKS TO JOURNALISTS DURING A VISIT TO PORTO ALEGRE ON 20 APRIL, WHEN HE CAREFULLY PROFESSED EQUALLY FRIENDLY FEELINGS FOR BOTH THE ARGENTINE AND BRITISH PEOPLES AND EXPRESSED THE PIOUS HOPE THAT THE LATTER WOULD USE THEIR WELL-KNOWN GOOD SENSE TO FIND A WAY OUT OF THE PRESENT CRISIS - IMPLYING THAT THE ARGENTINES COULD HARDLY BE EXPECTED TO HAVE ANY.

6. I DO NOT THINK THAT THE MESSAGE CALLS FOR ANY DIRECT COMMENT FROM US AT THIS STAGE. BUT I GAINED A CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT GUERREIRO WOULD LIKE TO KEEP A BILATERAL DIALOGUE GOING WITH US ON THIS QUESTION, AS I BELIEVE HE DOES WITH THE ARGENTINES. INDEED, I THINK HE SHARES PRESIDENT FIGUEIREDO'S VIEW THAT WE ARE MORE LIKELY TO COME UP WITH A SATISFACTORY ANSWER TO THE SOVEREIGNTY CONUNDRUM THAN ARE OUR OPPONENTS. GIVEN THE FACT THAT HE SAW A GOOD DEAL OF THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER AT THIS WEEK'S OAS MEETING, YOU MAY THINK THE TIME IS RIPE FOR YOU YOURSELF TO SEND HIM A MESSAGE OUTLINING YOUR VIEWS. EVEN IF THIS DOES NO MORE THAN REPEAT WHAT YOU HAVE SAID IN PARLIAMENT, I THINK THAT THE EFFECT OF THE GESTURE BOTH ON GUERREIRO AND ON FIGUEIREDO WOULD BE POSITIVE. IT MAY HELP WHEN WE NEED THEIR SUPPORT, AS WE SURELY WILL EVENTUALLY.

7. SEE MIFT.

HARDING

NNNN

SENT/RECD AT 30:2305Z AD/JW

OO WASHINGTON DESKBY 302200Z

OO UKMIS NEW YORK DESKBY 302200Z

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30 APR 1982

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FM BRASLIA 302230Z APR 82

TO IMMEDIATE FOO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 145 OF 30 APRIL

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK

MIPT: FALKLANDS: UNITED NATIONS INVOLVEMENT

1. FOLLOWING IS ENGLISH TEXT OF BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL COMMUNICATED BY TELEPHONE TO THE BRAZILIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE IN NEW YORK AT 302000Z.

BEGINS. GIVEN THE CONTINUING WORSENING OF THE CRISIS BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC AND THAT THE ~~OUT~~<sup>T</sup>BREAK OF AN ARMED CONFLICT IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC IS IMMINENT, THE GOVERNMENT OF BRAZIL BELIEVES IT IS IMPERATIVE TO IMMEDIATELY ACTIVATE THE MECHANISMS ESTABLISHED BY THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO TAKE PROMPT AND EFFECTIVE MEASURES, INCLUDING THOSE OF A PREVENTIVE NATURE, TO ENSURE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 502 (1982), IN ALL ITS ASPECTS.

HIGHEST CONSIDERATION, RAMIRAO SARAIVA GUERREIRO, MINISTER OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL. ENDS.

HARDING

PARA 1 LINE SEVEN SHD READ QUOTE AND THAT THE OUTBREAK OF UNQUOTE

NNNN

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Al Board 13.  
**TOP COPY**  
 - 6 MAY 1982

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INDEX	PA
	Action Taken

CONFIDENTIAL

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 GRS 230  
 CONFIDENTIAL  
 FM FCO 041615Z MAY 82  
 TO IMMEDIATE BRASILIA  
 TELEGRAM NUMBER 95 OF 4 MAY

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK  
 YOUR TELNOS 144 AND 145: FALKLANDS: PROPOSED MESSAGE TO  
 BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER

1. WE HAVE CONSIDERED THIS PROPOSAL CAREFULLY. WE ACCEPT THE NEED TO KEEP THE BRAZILIANS IN PLAY AND TO PREVENT AN INCREASING BRAZILIAN TILT TOWARDS ARGENTINA.
2. THE PROBLEM IS THAT WE HAVE LITTLE TO SAY TO THE BRAZILIANS AT THIS STATE WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY A PERSONAL MESSAGE. IT WOULD NEED TO REFER TO SR GUERREIRO'S MESSAGE TO THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, WHICH, AS YOU SAY, IS WELL-MEANT BUT NOT HELPFUL. ALSO, FOLLOWING THE BREAKDOWN OF THE HAIG NEGOTIATIONS AND WITH A SHARPER FOCUS ON THE MILITARY ASPECTS, IT WOULD BE HARD TO STRIKE A LINE TO WHICH THE BRAZILIANS COULD RESPOND. IT WOULD THEREFORE SEEM BEST TO KEEP SUCH A MESSAGE IN RESERVE IN CASE WE NEED TO SEEK THEIR SUPPORT FOR ANY DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE, FOLLOWING MY VISIT TO WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK.
3. STRICTLY FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, BRAZIL'S NAME HAS COME UP IN THE CONTEXT OF THE RECENT PERUVIAN PROPOSALS WHICH HAVE NOW RECEIVED PUBLICITY. WERE THESE PROPOSALS, TO WHICH I REFERRED IN THE HOUSE TODAY, TO DEVELOP, WE MIGHT THEN HAVE SOMETHING MORE CONSTRUCTIVE TO PUT TO THE BRAZILIANS. IT WOULD THEREFORE SEEM BEST TO HOLD OUR HAND ON MESSAGES AT THIS STAGE UNTIL DECISIONS ON POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS ARE TAKEN.

PYM

FCO  
 S AM D  
 CABINET OFFICE

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